Department of Savings and Loan by Hilberg, S.
l REGULATORY AGENCY ACTION 
or both for transient occupancy in a dwell-
mg unit in a common interest develop-
ment, in a dwelling unit in an apartment 
building or complex, or in a single-family 
home. This bill was signed by the Gover-
nor on July 8 (Chapter 134, Statutes of 
1992). 
AB 3469 (T. Friedman) was amended 
to pertain only to savings and loan institu-
tions (see infra agency report on 
DEPARTMENT OF SAVINGS AND 
LOAN). 
The following bills died in committee: 
AB 2154 (Hannigan), which would have 
changed the licensing/certification dead-
line applicable to any person who engages 
in federally related real estate appraisal 
activity, to the required date, including 
administrative extensions, set by the Ap-
praisal Subcommittee of the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Coun-
cil for regulation of federally related real 
estate appraisal activity; and AB 2666 
(Baker), which would have included in an 
existing exemption from the definit10n of 
a real estate broker any employee of a 
broker performing specified functions in 
connection with the renting or leasing of 
real property managed by the broker and 
used for vacation or recreational purposes, 
other than timeshare management persons 
who perform similar functions with regard 
to real estate sales, exchanges, loans, or 
loan servicing. 
■ LITIGATION 
On June 11, the bankruptcy reor-
ganization plan of Pioneer Mortgage, 
which filed for bankruptcy in January 
1991, was approved by U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court Judge James W. Meyers. [ 11:2 
CRLR 127} Current Pioneer management 
estimates that over the next five years, 
investors may recover 35 cents on the 
dollar: an additional 15 cents on the dollar 
may be recovered by the investors from 
several civil suits against Pioneer's ser-
vice providers. Approximately 2,000 in-
vestors put about $200 mi Ilion into 
Pioneer prior to its 1991 collapse. In addi-
tion to the civil litigation, the U.S. 
Attorney's Office is investigating possible 
criminal violations by former Pioneer ex-
ecutives. 
DEPARTMENT OF 
SAVINGS AND LOAN 
Commissioner: 
Wallace T Sumimoto 
(415) 557-3666 
(213) 736-2798 
The Department of Savings and Loan (DSL) is headed by a commissioner 
who has "general supervision over all as-
sociations, savings and loan holding com-
panies, service corporations, and other 
persons" (Financial Code section 8050). 
DSL holds no regularly scheduled meet-
ings, except when required by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. The Savings 
and Loan Association Law is in sections 
5000 through I 0050 of the California 
Financial Code. Departmental regulations 
are m Chapter 2, Title IO of the California 
Code of Regulations (CCR). 
■ MAJOR PROJECTS 
Merger Bill Vetoed By Governor. On 
September 30, Governor Wilson vetoed 
SB 506 (McCorquodale), which would 
have transferred the licensing and 
regulatory functions of DSL, the Savings 
and Loan Commissioner, the State Bank-
ing Department. and the Superintendent of 
Banking to a newly-created Department 
of State Banking and Savings and Loan. 
[12:2&3 CRLR 185]In his veto message, 
Governor Wilson stated that while he sup-
ports streamlining state government, SB 
506 is "seriously flawed, and will not 
achieve its intended goal." According to 
Wilson, the bill would have eliminated 
current authority, rules, regulations, and 
orders of the established departments 
"without proper. consistent, and well 
defined transfer of these authorities to the 
new department. The effect of this 1s to 
leave some financial institutions, such as 
transmitters of money orders, business 
development corporations, local agency 
securities, among others, unregulated by 
any state agency." The Governor added 
that the "underlying need to consolidate 
the Department of Savmgs and Loan with 
another state agency still exists. However, 
this consolidation must be approached 
with careful attention to the regulatory, 
operational, and technical aspects of the 
policy to provide regulatory protection for 
the citizens of California." 
HomeFed Seized by Federal 
Regulators. On July 6. federal regulators 
seized control of San Diego-based Home-
Fed Bank, the eighth largest savings and 
loan institution in the country. HomeFed, 
the largest S&L to fail in United States 
history, is said to have lost$ I billion since 
California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1992) 
1990 due to bad loans and foreclosed real 
estate. Despite this action, HomeFed 
remains open under the management of 
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), 
the federal agency created by Congress to 
liquidate failed S&Ls. Although RTC and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
had hoped to sell Home Fed as a less costly 
altemati veto liquidation, RTC lacked suf-
ficient funds to protect any prospective 
buyer from HomeFed's bad loans. OTS 
Director Timothy Ryan blamed Congress 
for causing HomeFed's takeover, claim-
ing that when Congress failed to provide 
RTC with the additional funds it needed in 
order to complete the S&L clean-up, OTS 
was forced to seize institutions that other-
wise would have been the subject of as-
sisted sales; according to OTS, rescuing 
thrifts through assisted sales costs half as 
much as seizure and liquidation. In 
response to this criticism, House of Rep-
resentatives Banking Committee staffers 
noted that RTC ran out of money because 
it failed to use all of the $25 billion Con-
gress gave the agency in late 1991; al-
though Congress established an April 
deadline for using up the money, $17 bil-
lion remained unused by RTC at that time 
and was thus frozen. [ 12:2&3 CRLR 185-
86] 
OTS determined that HomeFed's weak 
financial condition was due primarily to a 
high level of non-performing assets, large-
ly the result of poor investment decisions 
implemented by former management. Al-
though HomeFed Chair Kim Fletcher 
blamed the thrift's problems on various 
federal requirements, such as the strict 
capital regulations which were imple-
mented in 1989, former HomeFed Cor-
poration Director David Dunn agreed that 
the thrift was poorly run, adding that 
HomeFed "pursued growth aggressively 
without bringing judgment to bear on it." 
Further, HomeFed president Thomas 
Wageman has admitted that he knew at the 
beginning of 1992 that the S&L faced 
serious financial difficulties and would 
require federal assistance. 
FDIC Raises Premiums for Weak 
S&Ls. Beginning January I, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
will increase insurance premiums paid by 
S&Ls to FDIC to an average of 24 cents 
per $ I 00 of deposits. However, the heal-
thiest, best-managed institutions will be 
exempt from the increase; only the 
country's weaker S&Ls, whose risk of 
failure is greater, will be subject to the 
increased premiums. Presently, all FDIC-
insured institutions pay 23 cents in 
premiums for every $ I 00 of deposits; 
strong institutions-including about 60% 
of FDIC-insured S&Ls and 75% of FDIC-
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insured banks-will continue to pay this 
rate. Premiums for weaker institutions 
will increase by three to eight cents per 
$ I 00 in deposits, depending on which of 
nine categories the institutions fall into; 
each category reflects a graduated safety 
rating. In determining risk category as-
signments, the Office of Thrift Super-
vision will use federal or state examina-
tion reports and other risk indicators. 
The plan is designed to place the bur-
den of strengthening the deposit insurance 
fund on the institutions which pose the 
greatest risk of failure. Although federal 
regulators contend that such troubled in-
stitutions ought to pay more for deposit 
insurance, they admit that the higher 
premiums will increase the likelihood of 
these S&Ls failing or being forced into 
mergers because it will raise the cost of 
doing business for S&Ls that already are 
having difficulties making money. U.S. 
Senator Donald Riegle, Jr. (D-Michigan), 
chair of the Senate Banking Committee, is 
critical of the plan, which he has stated is 
too lenient. Riegle believes that all 
federally-insured institutions should bear 
the costs of rebuilding the insurance fund. 
The rate increase is expected to raise an 
additional $200 million per year from the 
savings and loan industry, and ap-
proximately $600 million per year from 
banks, which are subject to the same 
premium increases. 
New Federal Rules Hasten Shut-
down of Ailing S&Ls. In late September, 
the Office of Thrift Supervision adopted 
tough new rules which will speed the 
closure of troubled S&Ls. The corrective 
action scheme, which took effect on 
December 19, implements new section 38 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and 
divides financial institutions into five 
categories: well-capitalized. adequately 
capitalized, undercapitalized, significant-
ly undercapitalized, and critically under-
capi talized. Regulatory responses are 
similarly graded-stronger restnctions 
are imposed as an institution falls into 
lower categories. An institution will be 
deemed to be: 
-well-capitalized if it has a total risk-
based capital ratio of 6% or greater, and a 
leverage ratio of 5% or greater, and the 
institution is not subject to an order, wnt-
ten agreement, capital directive, or prompt 
corrective action directive to meet and 
maintain a specific capital level for any 
capital measure; 
-adequately capitalized if it has a total 
risk-based capital ratio of 8% or greater, a 
Tier I risk-based capital ratio of 4% or 
greater, and a leverage ratio of 4% or 
greater (or a leverage ratio of3% or greater 
if the institution is rated composite I in its 
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most recent report of examination, subject 
to appropriate federal guidelines), and the 
institution does not meet the definition of 
a well-capitalized institution; 
-undercapitalized if it has a total risk-
based capital ratio that is less than 8%, a 
Tier I risk-based capital ratio that is less 
than 4%, or a leverage ratio that is less than 
4% (or a leverage ratio that is less than 3% 
if the institution is rated composite I in its 
most recent report of examination, subject 
to appropriate federal guidelines); 
-significantly undercapitalized if it has 
a total risk-based capital ratio that is less 
than 6%, a Tier I risk-based capital rat10 
that is less than 3%, or a leverage ratio that 
is less than 3%; or 
-cntically undercapitalized if it has a 
ratio of tangible equity to total assets that 
is equal to or less than 2%. 
Section 38's most severe response oc-
curs when an institution is determined by 
regulators to be critically undercapital-
ized. Once an institution reaches that 
level, regulators generally will be required 
to close it within 90 days, unless its con-
dition dramatically improves. According 
to the latest federal estimate, about 29 
S&Ls with a total of$57.5 billion in assets 
currently fit this category, and are in 
danger of being closed either prior to or 
within 90 days of the December 19 effec-
tive date. 
Section 38's specific capital targets 
and progressive responses provide S&L 
executives with adequate knowledge of 
their capital classification. Formal 
notification is given through inspection 
reports by federal regulators; in addition, 
informal hearings are provided when an 
institution's capital classification is 
downgraded. This new regulatory action 
is intended to alert executives and 
regulators to an institution's declining 
health, encourage weaker institutions to 
correct their problems quickly, and save 
insurance fund money by closing weak 
S&Ls while there is still some capital left 
in them. 
California Thrifts Lead Nation in 
Bad Loans. According to a report by 
Texas-based Sheshunoff Information Ser-
vices, a bank consulting firm. California's 
S&Ls led the nation in the amount of bad 
loans during the first quarter of 1992. Ac-
cording to the report, the state's S&Ls had 
$8.7 billion in bad loans, more than three 
times the amount in any other state. How-
ever, problem loans at the state's savings 
and loan institutions comprised 3.8% of 
total loans,just slightly above the national 
average of 3.3%. 
Regulators Criticized for Ignoring 
Lending Bias. In conjunction with a Sep-
tember hearing of the Senate Banking 
Committee's Housing Subcommittee, 
Senator Alan Cranston (D-California) 
contended that bank and thrift regulators 
have been lax in their enforcement of the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and 
other fair lending laws; the CRA requires 
lenders to meet the credit needs of their 
entire communities, including low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods. 
Cranston stated that regulators have given 
87% of the banks and savings and loan 
institutions reviewed a rating of "satisfac-
tory" or better during examinations over 
the last two years, despite evidence that 
minority and inner city areas continue to 
be underserved by depository lending in-
stitutions. For example, a recent Los An-
geles Times study of lending patterns in 
Los Angeles County showed that Wells 
Fargo and Bank of America-the biggest 
financial lenders in the state-made a 
combined total of 113 loans to African-
Americans in 1990; however, both banks 
received "outstanding" CRA ratings from 
their federal evaluator, the Comptroller of 
the Currency. That same Los Angeles 
Times study also showed that S&Ls are 
much more active than banks in lending to 
African-Americans and other minority 
group members. 
Senator Cranston said his staff found 
instances when FDIC examiners found 
possible violations of the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act and the Federal Fair 
Housing Act, but failed to report the situa-
tion to the Justice Department as is re-
quired under federal law. Representatives 
of the banking industry said that lenders 
do not intentionally discriminate against 
low-income, inner city communities, al-
though they acknowledge that low-in-
come, minonty borrowers sometimes face 
obstacles in obtaining credit. According to 
the Independent Bankers Association of 
America (!BAA), bankers cite the CRA as 
one of the most onerous regulations with 
which they must comply; small banks 
with limited resources find the CRA's re-
quirements for providing and analyzing 
data particularly burdensome, according 
to IBAA. Cranston criticized the federal 
regulators' apparent sympathy toward the 
financial institutions, stating that "[t]he 
tendency of agencies to act as protectors 
of the banks rather than as regulators 
profoundly distorts the process." 
■ LEGISLATION 
The following is a status update on 
bills reported in detail in CRLR Vol. 12, 
Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1992) at page 
186: 
SB 506 (McCorquodale) would have 
transferred the licensing and regulatory 
functions of DSL, the Savings and Loan 
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Commissioner, the State Banking Depart-
ment, and the Superintendent of Banking 
to the Department of State Banking and 
Savings and Loan, which the bill would 
have created. This bill was vetoed by the 
Governor on September 30. 
AB 3469 (T. Friedman). Existing 
provisions of the Savings Association 
Law prescnbe various criminal offenses 
and penalties for violations thereof, and 
provide for forfeiture of property or 
proceeds derived from these violations. 
This bill expands those provisions to in-
clude other offenses the violation of which 
would be subject to forfeiture under the 
Savings Association Law. This bill also 
provides that a petition for forfeiture may 
be filed prior to, in conjunction with, or 
subsequent to a criminal proceeding, and 
if filed prior to the criminal proceedings, 
the prosecuting agency shall provide con-
current notice to any parties subject to the 
proposed forfeiture that they are targets of 
an anticipated criminal action. The peti-
tion and any injunctive order shall be dis-
missed unless a criminal complaint is filed 
within 120 days after the filing of the 
petition. The bill also provides that no 
injunctive order shall impair the ability of 
a defendant or interested party to pay legal 
fees relating to the criminal charges. 
Existing law provides that the 
proceeds of forfeited property shall be dis-
tributed to the bona fide or innocent pur-
chaser, conditional sales vendor, or holder 
of a valid lien, mortgage, or security inter-
est, as specified. This bill provides that the 
balance of any forfeited funds shall also 
be distributed to the victim of specified 
crimes committed by the defendants. This 
bill was signed by the Governor on Sep-
tember 30 (Chapter 1280, Statutes of 
1992). 
ABX 45 (Peace), which would have 
prohibited state, city, and county govern-
ments from contracting for services with 
financial institutions with $100 million or 
more in assets unless those companies file 
reports annually with the state Controller, 
and SB 1396 (Marks), which would have 
required financial institutions which as-
semble, evaluate, or disseminate informa-
tion on the checking account experiences 
of consumer customers of banks or other 
financial institutions to give specified 
notices to new customers, died in commit-
tee. 
■ LITIGATION 
On July I 0, in one of the numerous 
lawsuits stemming from the failure of Lin-
coln Savings and Loan, a federal jury or-
dered financier Charles Keating, Jr., and 
three co-defendants to pay over $3 billion 
in damages for conspiring to defraud in-
vestors; specifically, the jury awarded the 
20,000 class action plaintiffs $600 million 
in compensatory damages and$ 1.5 billion 
in punitive damages from Keating, and 
$1.4 billion in compensatory damages and 
$900 million in punitive damages from 
Keating's co-defendants. [ Jl: 1 CRLR 
105 J However, U.S. District Court Judge 
Richard Bilby had instructed the jury that 
it could not award punitive damages 
against any defendant other than Keating; 
it is unclear whether Judge Bilby will 
allow the $900 million award. Keating, 
already in prison on California criminal 
convictions stemming from the same ac-
tivities, sent no lawyers to defend him in 
the damages phase of this civil proceed-
ing, claiming that he could not afford to. 
Keating was scheduled to go on trial in 
Los Angeles in October on federal 
criminal charges of fraud, conspiracy, and 
racketeering stemming from the 1989 col-
lapse of Lincoln. 
On June 24, former Columbia Savings 
and Loan Chief Executive Thomas 
Spiegel was indicted on 55 criminal 
counts; the federal charges allege that 
Spiegel misappropriated millions of dol-
lars from the now-defunct S&L. Among 
other things, federal officials contend that 
Spiegel made misrepresentations to 
federal regulators and Columbia's board 
of directors regarding his compensation; 
used$ I million of the S&L's money to buy 
a vacation condominium in Palm Springs 
for his family; and used the S&L's money 
to buy tens of thousands of dollars worth 
of firearms and accessories. If convicted, 
Spiegel faces up to 275 years in prison and 
$ I 3 million in fines. Columbia failed in 
January 1991, largely due to losses on its 
huge holdings of real estate and risky, 
high-yield junk bonds; the total cost of the 
S&L's failure to taxpayers is estimated at 
$1.2 billion. [ll:2 CRLR 128-29] 
In Statesman Savings Holding Cor-
poration and Glendale Federal Bank v. 
United States, Nos. 90-773C and 90-772C 
(July 24, 1992), both plaintiffs acquired 
failing savings and loan institutions prior 
to the enactment of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA ); in both cases, 
plaintiffs negotiated certain terms, such as 
capital standards, with the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation. Follow-
ing FIRREA's enactment, Statesman and 
Glendale were no longer afforded the 
favorable terms that had been part of their 
agreement with the federal government. 
Plaintiffs claimed that FIRREA's enact-
ment breached their contracts with the 
government and effected a taking in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment of the U.S. 
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Constitution. 
Relying on its previous ruling in 
Wins tar Corporation v. U.S., 21 Cl.Ct. 112 
(1990), the U.S. Claims Court granted 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
as to liability, finding that the agreements 
between plaintiffs and the federal govern-
ment constituted contracts, and that the 
enactment of FIRREA breached those 
contracts in light of the sovereign acts 
doctrine. As a result of its finding, the 
court deferred consideration of plaintiffs' 
constitutional claim. Although the court 
found that plaintiffs are entitled to restitu-
tion, it did not set that amount; instead, 
anticipating an appeal by the federal 
government, the court certified its 
decision for interlocutory appeal to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit. (For a summary of a related case, see 
12: I CRLR 129-30.) 
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